Dimensions of Diversity: Legal Lessons
from the United States Supreme Court’s University
of Michigan Decisions
By Arthur L. Coleman and Scott R. Palmer*
Race and ethnicity matter. Educational judgments merit
deference. And diversity counts. Affirming these fundamental
principles as a matter of federal law, the United States
Supreme Court in Gratz v. Bollingeri and
Grutter v. Bollinger,i ruled
that colleges and universities have the authority to
consider race or ethnicityii as
one factor among many in admissions decisions to further
their compelling interest in promoting the educational
benefits of diversity. The Court also held that when
institutions pursue this interest, only admissions programs
designed that ensure individualized consideration of
applicants can be sufficiently narrowly tailored to
meet legal requirements. Thus, the Court upheld the
University of Michigan Law School’s admissions
policy (in Grutter), which included an individualized,
full-file review of all applications, but struck down
the University of Michigan’s undergraduate admissions
policy (in Gratz), which assigned preset points to applicants
based on certain admissions criteria, including race
and ethnicity.
These decisions affirm—and build upon—Justice
Powell’s 1978 opinion in Regents of the University
of California v. Bakke regarding the educational benefits
of diversity in higher education.iii
They also expand on the existing federal “strict
scrutiny” framework in important ways that can
help to guide colleges and universities as they review
and consider the use of race-conscious policies in admissions,
financial aid, recruitment, and employment practices.
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The Court found that
diverse learning environments can would enhance
“cross-racial understanding,” “break
down racial stereotypes,” improve learning
outcomes, and better prepare students for a diverse
workforce and society. |
The Dimensions of Diversity in Higher Education
The Court in Grutter described at length the
educational benefits of diversity that constitute a
compelling interest that can justify the use of race
in college and university admissions. The Court acknowledged
higher education's overarching mission—to prepare
students for “work and citizenship” and
to sustain “our political and cultural heritage”—and
just as it recognized the indisputable fact that “race
unfortunately still matters” in our society. In
this context, and based on a wide array of evidence,
the Court found that diverse learning environments can
would enhance “cross-racial understanding,”
“break down racial stereotypes,” improve
learning outcomes, and better prepare students for a
diverse workforce and society. In short, the Court concluded
that the university’s educational judgment that
diversity is essential to its mission is entitled to
a degree of deference and that the compelling nature
of diversity in higher education is supported by a wide
array of evidenceeducational benefits of diversity represented
“compelling interests” that justify limited
use of race-conscious measures in higher education.
In addition, the Court also recognized the interests
related to the importance of “the openness and
integrity” of higher education institutions and
stressed the importance of students from all racial
and ethnic groups having access to public universities
and law schools. In the specific case of Grutter, the
Court recognized the special emphasis on the role of
laws schools as “the training ground for a large
number of our Nation’s leaders,” and the
Court concluded, “[I]n order to cultivate a set
of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry,
it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly
open to talented and qualified individuals of every
race and ethnicity.”
Practical Lessons from the Court Decisions
The Court’s central rulings provide important
information that should help higher education leaders
evaluate and refine race-conscious policies. The following
questions (and answers) emanate from the Court’s
decisions:
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• Inventory all race-
and ethnicity-based policies and all other diversity-related
policies (even if race-neutral), including admissions,
financial aid, outreach, recruitment, and employment
policies.
• Establish an inter-disciplinary strategic
planning team and a process to evaluate the relevant
policies, now and over time.
• Identify the diversity-related educational
goals and supporting evidence that justify each
of the relevant policies.
• Rigorously consider race-neutral alternatives
in light of institutional goals.
• Ensure that any consideration of race
is as limited as possible consistent with institutional
diversity goals, including that admissions processes
are individualized, flexible, and holistic. |
What foundations should support the pursuit
and design of race-conscious admissions programs?
Premised upon long-standing constitutional
principles affirming the academic freedom of higher
education institutions, the Court provided deference
to the University’s “educational judgment”
that diversity was “essential to its educational
mission.” The Court then reviewed the evidence
regarding the “substantial” benefits of
diversity—ranging from University-specific evidence
to evidence provided by other parties filing briefs
in the case—notably including expert reports and
opinions from business and military leaders. With these
foundations, the Court concluded that diversity is a
“compelling interest that can justify the narrowly
tailored use of race in selecting applicants for admission
to public universities.”
In addition, the Court also explained that colleges
and universities may seek to promote diversity through
the enrollment of a “critical mass” of students
from different racial and ethnic groups, so long as
the critical mass is “defined by reference to
the educational benefits that diversity is designed
to produce”; and the goal is not “some specified
percentage of a particular group merely because of its
race or ethnic origin.” The Court admonished that
“outright racial balancing…is patently unconstitutional.”
Finally, when examining the design of the challenged
admissions practices, the Court emphasized the need
for individualized judgments regarding the University’s
applicants: “In other words, an admissions program
must be ‘flexible enough to consider all pertinent
elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications
of each applicant, and to place them on the same footing
for consideration, although not necessarily according
them the same weight.’”
The Court’s opinions suggest, therefore, that
higher education institutions seeking to justify race-conscious
practices based on diversity interests should ensure
the following:
- Mission-specific educational goals that include
diversity-related interests can support race-conscious
policies;
- Specific race-conscious policies do materially advance
diversity-related goals, consistent with relevant
evidence (which may include general as well as institution-specific
evidence and research); and
- Policy and program designs are precisely tailored
to meet institutional diversity interests, including
with respect to admissions, an individualized review
of applicants.
What race-neutral alternatives must institutions
with race-conscious programs consider?
When addressing the legal requirement that
higher education institutions consider and try, as appropriate,
race-neutral alternatives to their race-conscious programs,
the Court first clarified that the need to examine those
alternatives “does not require exhaustion of every
conceivable race-neutral alternative.” The Court
stated: “Narrow tailoring does, however, require
serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral
alternatives that will achieve the diversity the university
seeks.” The Court also emphasized that race-neutral
alternatives should be evaluated in the overall context
of an institution’s diversity and other mission-driven
goals. More specifically, the Court held that colleges
and universities need not “choose between maintaining
a reputation for excellence or fulfilling a commitment
to provide educational opportunities to members of all
racial groups.” Thus, a college or university
is not required to deemphasize academic factors to promote
diversity before using race.
What impact will the Court’s decisions
regarding admissions policies at the University of Michigan
have on higher education policies in the areas of financial
aid, recruitment, and employment?
Although the Court was silent on applicability
of its admissions rulings to other higher education
practices, it affirmed a relevant principle of federal
law: “context matters.” In other words,
while strict scrutiny standards apply to all race-conscious
practices, those standards may apply in different ways
to different programs. Thus, the degree to which a college
or university may rely on the Court’s determination
that the educational benefits of diversity are compelling
as a matter of law to support its race-conscious policies
will depend on an institutional evaluation that addresses
several questions. First, does the race-conscious policy
or program advance the goal of achieving the educational
benefits of diversity, which is at the core of the institution’s
mission? If the answer to that question is “yes,”
does the policy or program also reinforce individualized
diversity by using race in the most limited way, consistent
with institutional goals?iv While
the Court’s rulings should undoubtedly inform
this evaluation, it is especially important to evaluate
the Court’s fact-intensive analysis—most
visibly regarding the design and operation of the two
admissions policies—with sensitivity to the context
that shaped its conclusions.v
Conclusion
The Court in Grutter observed that “race-conscious
admissions policies must be limited in time.”
More concretely, it communicated the “expect[ation]
that twenty-five years from now, the use of racial preferences
will no longer be necessary to further the [diversity]
interest approved today.” This admonition highlights
the need for all institutions employing race-conscious
programs to periodically review and refine their programs
to ensure that their use of race is limited to advance
diversity related educational goals.
ENDNOTES
i Gratz et al. v. Bollinger et al., No. 02-516,
539 U.S. __ (June 23, 2003).
ii Grutter v. Bollinger et al., No. 02-241,
539 U.S. __ (June 23, 2003).
iii In this article, the term “race” or
“ethnicity” stands for both race and ethnicity,
such as with regard to “race-conscious”
actions.
iv University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978).
v See generally Diversity in Higher Education: A
Strategic Planning and Policy Manual (The College Board,
2001) (including a detailed, action-oriented series
of relevant policy questions to address in the context
of federal non-discrimination standards).
vi See generally Nondiscrimination in Federally
Assisted Programs: Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 59 Fed. Reg. 8756 (February 23, 1994)
(noting important and material differences between admissions
and financial aid practices in the context of a strict
scrutiny analysis).
*Arthur Coleman and Scott Palmer are counsel at
Nixon Peabody LLP in Washington, D.C. where they provide
legal and policy advice to education officials to help
them achieve their educational goals in ways that satisfy
federal legal requirements—including affirmative
action policy and program analyses and audits for states
and higher education institutions. They formerly served
as back-to-back deputy assistant secretaries for civil
rights in the U.S. Department of Education. They may
be reached at 202.585.8000 or www.nixonpeabody.com.
This article is intended as a source of information
and should not be construed as legal advice. Readers
should not act upon information in this article without
professional counsel. |